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Bow Before the Portrait: Sino-North Korean Relations 
Enter the Kim Jong Un Era 
December 23, 2011 in Uncategorized by The China Beat 
By Adam Cathcart 
The pigs were being slaughtered in the streets when the news of Kim Jong Il’s death arrived in 
Dachuan, a small logging village in the mountains of western Sichuan province. Over the 
immense and extended cacophony of the blood-letting, the retired head of the local bank 
explained, with a bit of apologetic joy, that the villagers were getting ready for Spring Festival, 
then turned back to the news from Pyongyang, shaking his head at the retrograde tendencies of 
China’s Korean socialist brothers. 
It was a fitting juxtaposition, watching events in North Korea amid the production of reams of 
red pork with rich peasants in China. Meat, after all, was the sine qua non of success for Kim Il 
Sung and his son, both of whom proclaimed their magnanimous desire to make good on the 
promise of “rice with meat soup” in every pot (and a tile roof for every rural house). Yet, as even 
a cursory read of virtually any analysis or short trip to the North Korean border with China can 
attest, the battle for higher living standards—as opposed to monuments—in essentially every 
place outside of the DPRK’s model capital has been lost. Mao Zedong said he could do without 
meat, making revolution with just grain and rifles, but North Korea has ample rifles but no grain, 
and the revolution is dead. 
Amid the welter of random, confusing, instructive, and occasionally cruel responses to Kim Jong 
Il’s death among Chinese, Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 has been a touchstone. This particular 
parallel, encouraged by Chinese state media, is significant because it implicitly holds out the 
hope that a market-oriented North Korean Deng Xiaoping might yet emerge out of the factions 
assumed to be maneuvering in Pyongyang. But North Korea is hardly exiting the “fractured 
rebellion” of a Cultural Revolution. The DPRK remains instead in the thrall of a persistently 
centralized leadership system in which Kim Il Sung and his son had purged, jailed, exiled, or 
killed all the advocates of possible systemic alternatives. In Andrei Lankov’s phrase, the “blade 
of state of state remains sharp enough to cut off its diseased parts,” and gazing at the grizzled 
ranks of the Pyongyang senior elite, it seems unlikely that some wholesale adoption of Chinese-
style market reforms is in the offing. 
The Reluctant Embrace of Kim Jong Un 
On December 21, Wen Jiabao went to the North Korean embassy in Beijing, bowed to Kim Jong 
Il’s portrait, and said: “We believe that with the Korean Workers’ Party under the leadership of 
comrade Kim Jong Un, the North Korean people will certainly powerfully pass through their 
grief, pushing forward to new successes in socialist construction.” It was a turn of events which 
but a few years earlier would have been seen as unlikely. Since Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008, and 
the rumors of Kim Jong Un’s existence as a viable successor to his father in early 2009, the CCP 
has gone through a number of stances toward the idea, ending in the acceptance of the successor. 
In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test of May 2009, Beijing loosened its grip on 
journalism about the DPRK in the Chinese media, using the new latitude to serve the Party’s 
foreign policy purposes. Publications about the North Korean role in starting the Korean War 
were suddenly acceptable, and, more importantly, a number of unflattering portrayals of the 
“weird” Kim family began to emerge. Chinese public intellectuals like Zhu Feng and Shen 
Dingli speculated about rapid changes in North Korea and the CCP made clear its desire, at the 
very least, for North Korea to transition to a more collective leadership centered in the Korean 
Workers’ Party rather than in the enfeebled Kim Jong Il or his relatively unknown successor. 
However, after Kim Jong Un’s formal unveiling at the September 2010 KWP Congress in 
Pyongyang, the discourse shifted decisively toward a more supportive line toward the “young 
general.” Likenesses between Chinese and North Korean political cultures were emphasized; in 
mass magazine portrayals, CCP scholars encouraged Kim Jong Un to “make his mark via some 
achievements in writing about communist theory.” 
Even Kim Jong Un’s foreign experience was highlighted in Chinese media as beneficial. It 
seemed that in some important ways, Kim Jong Un could be used to send home the message to 
China’s unreceptive youth: It may be fine to spend a few years studying abroad and fall in love 
with Michael Jordan, but when you come home, it’s all about the Young Pioneers and Party 
building. More importantly, the junior Kim’s probable role in North Korean attacks on the South 
Korean vessel “Cheonan” in March 2010 and on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 was 
downplayed in the PRC. South Korean stories which asserted that Kim Jong Un had assumed 
control over North Korea’s northern border security, like most narratives focused on refugees, 
did not enter the public discourse in China. 
The CCP’s evident nervousness about stability in North Korea, and its protective stance toward 
the DPRK, means that no loud public doubts about Kim Jong Un’s inexperience are presently 
welcome. Suggestions that the successor is incapable of leading, when allowed at all, are placed 
in the mouths of foreign experts like the International Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston, and 
qualified with some implication that South Korean media reports could all be false anyway. 
North Korea appears to have made only a minor rhetorical concession to Chinese pressure by 
referring to the idea of “uniting around the Korean Workers’ Party and Comrade Kim Jong Un,” 
a phrase codified in the DPRK’s official response to the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s initial 
statement of regret at Kim Jong Il’s death. 
Economic and Cultural Exchanges 
The legacy of Kim Jong Il’s rapid—one might almost say rushed—advancement of cooperation 
with China in 2010 and 2011 hangs in the balance, and the CCP will be eager for cross-border 
trade and tourism to resume. A rather explicit December 20 editorial in the Huanqiu Shibao, 
entitled “China is the Reliable Friend Upon Which North Korea Can Rely during Transition,” 
stated: “We suggest that as soon as it is appropriate, Chinese high-level leaders go to North 
Korea, where they will intimately communicate with North Korea’s new leaders at this special 
time that Pyongyang can send a distinct signal to the world [by taking the Chinese path].” 
In the weeks prior to Kim Jong Il’s death, China had been pressing for more clarification and 
motion on the two new island trade zones in the Yalu River near Sinuiju. While the Chinese side 
has been investing an immense amount of money in construction of what is essentially a new city 
outside of Dandong and a large new super-highway worthy bridge to the DPRK, the North 
Pyong’an leadership has been everything that privately infuriates Chinese partners: 
uncommunicative, inaccessible, and (according to the Daily NK) suddenly purged. 
Far more promising is the development at Rason, on the far northeastern edge of the Korean 
peninsula, where China has brought in an old Korea hand named Tian Baozhu, a Kim Il Sung 
University graduate and former Consul-General in Pusan, to set conditions for further Chinese 
investment in this highly-desired port which finally offers eastern Jilin and Heilongjiang 
provinces access to the sea and cheaper means of shipping coal to ports like Shanghai. Rason 
remains a source of rumors from South Korea and the active advocates of immediate North 
Korean collapse, who often imply that China is not simply constructing the port but has secured 
it with a few thousand PLA troops. Such impressions are unlikely to slow the CCP in its push for 
more access and faster development of Chinese business interests, particularly in the minerals 
sector, in North Korea. 
Chinese cultural exchanges with North Korea have been, in the DPRK context, incredibly 
extensive. The oft-maligned Korean Central News Agency has opened up exchanges with 
Xinhua, performing arts delegations tour across the Chinese mainland, and a Confucius Institute 
is open in Pyongyang with some 800 students. Tourism to the DPRK, another area of possible 
peril—seven Chinese tourists and businessmen were killed in a mysterious crash outside of 
Pyongyang on Thanksgiving Day—is an area where the Chinese side puts a great deal of stock 
and aims to develop further from even remote cities like Qiqihar and Mudanjiang. The extent to 
which the North Korean side remains committed to the speed and intensity of these relationships 
is something which the Chinese government is particularly keen to observe. 
Border security on the northern frontier remains a complex and sensitive issue, as well as 
military-to-military relations. The fact that eight North Korean border guards were reputed to 
have run headlong into the Liaoning hills in late November is not to be forgotten; the fact that 
China was hosting the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Navy in Qingdao (of all places) from 
December 19-23 is another area which under normal conditions might cause strain on Sino-
North Korean relations. 
Kim Jong Il’s death does not alter the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship, but it does offer 
an opportunity to take stock of this most fraught and significant relationship. The speed and 
intimacy with which it continues is of interest to us all. 
Adam Cathcart is Assistant Professor History at Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, 
Washington and the editor of SinoNK.com. 
 
